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BUILDING LEGAL COMPETENCY: FOUNDATIONS FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE DISCIPLINE
INTRODUCTION
Criminology and criminal justice, although a relatively new field in the social
sciences, is maturing and reaffirming itself as a rigorous academic discipline. The depth
of the discipline has been further established through research and literature in the
various areas of theory, methods, scope, and the discipline’s status as a field of
knowledge. From the growing number of professional conferences and associations to
the proliferation of doctoral programs and journals, criminology and criminal justice is
becoming more academically firm—shaking off the stigma from earlier decades of being
too “vocational” and coming into its own as a legitimate scientific discipline. The focus
on theory, policy, research methodologies, and various analytic approaches has led,
however, to a marginalization of areas that were once core to the discipline. Qualitative
research methodologies and legal studies, for example, appear to have been cast aside in
favor of more quantitative methods that are prevalent in social science (Nolasco,
Vaughn, & del Carmen, 2010).
This article suggests that the marginalization of law and legal courses from other
areas of discussion and research in criminal justice or criminology has hindered its full
development in criminology and criminal justice doctoral programs. This
marginalization is reflected in the hesitance of departments to hire non-law trained
academics to teach law courses and doctoral students to take courses that require
immersion and knowledge in law. Myers (2007, p. 5) illustrates the need for legal
competency in the discipline, stating that,
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[i]f it is a law course, I do not know too many Ph.D.’s who are qualified. Some
doctoral programs require legal courses and require students to pass a legal
comprehensive exam. I do not believe even those Ph.D.s are truly qualified to
teach legal courses to students because they do not have the extensive knowledge
held by the J.D. Unfortunately, some of these legally trained Ph.D.s do not selfreflect enough to acknowledge they are not prepared as their legal counterparts
to teach these courses.
This article further demonstrates how legal competency is necessary and
contributes towards a more effective and relevant academic discipline. Adequate legal
training within the program can effectively prepare criminology and criminal justice
doctoral students to undertake both legal and socio-legal research and possibly, teach
law courses as a competency in their academic path.
Background
Studies that focus on marginalized areas in the discipline, including disciplinary
disputes, are nothing new in criminal justice and criminology (Clear, 2001; Conrad &
Myren, 1979; DiCristina, 1997; Green, Bynum, & Webb, 1982; Morn, 1980; Nolasco,
Vaughn, del Carmen, 2010; Simpson, 1979; Steinmetz, Schaefer, del Carmen, & Hemmens,
2014; Worrall, 2000; Wrede & Featherstone, 2012; Zalman, 1981). Such works are
undoubtedly symptomatic of the discipline’s growing pains and are not unique to
criminal justice and criminology. These studies are important because they provide an
insight into issues that otherwise are left unexamined. From early debates within the
Joint Commission for Criminology and Criminal Justice Education and Standards (hereby
referred to as The Commission) over the boundaries between criminal justice and
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criminology (Conrad & Myren, 1979; Green, et al., 1982; Morn, 1980; Simpson, 1979;
Zalman, 1981) to efforts to distinguish criminal justice and criminology as a discipline
separate from sociology (Wrede & Featherstone, 2012), these studies are valuable in
articulating issues as well as providing a venue for open debate and discussions that help
define the boundaries of the discipline.
Revisiting some of these issues and expanding on this body of critiques, this
article posits that although there is a growing demand for legal competency in criminal
justice and criminology doctoral programs, law is still currently viewed as an isolated
field of knowledge, lacking relevance to the discipline. This has resulted in “dichotomous
debates of the J.D. versus the Ph.D. and criminology versus criminal justice” (Myers, 2007,
p.1). As of 2012, out of 36 doctoral programs listed by the Association of Doctoral
Programs in Criminology & Criminal Justice, 19 programs (52.78%) required classes that
claimed to study law or its legal aspects within criminal justice to some degree. These
courses range from those which focus on the sociology of law1 to black letter law2. In this
study, the authors analyzed course descriptions to determine whether a course focused
on law. If we consider, however, that at least some of these classes focus only
tangentially on legal issues or the sociology of law, it becomes apparent that the effort to
“The sociology of law, a new science, studies human behavior in society in so far as it is determined by
commonly recognized ethico-legal norms, and in so far as it influences them” (Timasheff, N.S. (1937). What is
“sociology of law”? American Journal of Sociology, 43, 225-235).
2“Black Letter Law refers to the basic standard elements or principles of law, which are generally known and
free from doubt or dispute. It describes the principles of law that are accepted by a majority of judges in most
states. For example, it can be the standard elements for a contract or the technical definition of assault. In
American legal system, it also means well-established case law” (USlegal.com (2014). Definition of black letter
law. Retrieved from http://definitions.uslegal.com/b/black-letter-law/. “The systematization and
formulation of the law in terms of doctrine creates a conceptual basis for constructing a legal context that
helps to determine which rules should be applied in a particular situation. In this sense, doctrinal studies
emerge out of the study of legal texts (or black-letter law), which are generated by legislature, courts and
other legal authorities, and feed back in to legal practice once they are used in deciding cases” (Banakar, R.
(2011). Review essay: Having one’s cake and eating it: The paradox of contextualization in socio-legal
research. International Journal of Law in Context, 7, 487-503).
1
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develop legal competency is lacking in doctoral programs. This is happening in a
discipline that is supposed to study the crimino-legal apparatus in addition to other areas
such as criminal etiology.
An examination of the origins of the discipline reveals an intention among early
scholars in the field to emphasize the importance of law and legal knowledge, particularly
criminal law and related legal studies. From its early beginnings, legal competency,
contrary to being marginalized in criminal justice and criminology, was an integral part of
criminal justice and criminology. Edwin Sutherland (1924), the noted father of
criminology, required his criminology students to minor in criminal law. Quinney (1970)
acknowledged that to understand crime, one must consider how criminal law shapes
crime:
There is no crime without some form of declaration. Crime has meaning only
when the concept of crime has first been constructed. Likewise, crime exists as a
problem only when a number of persons regard the phenomenon of crime as a
problem. Crime as both phenomenon and problem thus exists because of the
construction of the concept of crime. (Quinney, 1970, p. 3)
Recent studies in the discipline, however, tend to dissociate itself from social and
legal constructions of crime by focusing not on crime as a dependent variable but on the
broader notion of anti-social behavior (Eitle, Niedrist, & Eitle, 2014; Jennings, Higgins,
Akers, Khey, & Dobrow, 2013; Newton & Bussey 2012; Portnoy, Raine, Chen, Pardini,
Loeber, & Jennings, 2014). Setting aside arguments on the notion and construction of
anti-social behavior, criminal justice and criminology cannot completely dissociate itself
from examining and explaining crime as a legal and social construction (Quinney, 1970). To
4

do so denies the nature of crime, in its formal reality, as a product of law. As such, scholars
of criminal behavior should be properly trained in the nuances of criminal law and criminal
procedure to inform their behavioral and social analyses (Kelman, 2003; Wexler, 1990). To
understand a phenomenon, one must know why it exists. In a formal and realistic sense,
there is no crime without a law. What is criminal becomes immoral, deviant, aberrant, or
irritant behavior.
The deemphasis in criminal law and law courses may have first emerged due to
efforts of scholars in criminal justice and criminology to achieve the status of a legitimate
and scientific discipline in the 1970s and 1980s. This followed the influx of LEAA funding
that sought to promote the professionalization of the police through college education
(Conrad & Myren, 1979; Green, et al., 1982; Morn, 1980; Simpson, 1979; Zalman, 1981).
These efforts often distinguished between the academic and vocational faces of the
discipline. In the mix, education in criminal law and criminal procedure was considered
too practitioner-oriented. This article argues that law is a legitimate area of academic
inquiry and training and thus deserves to be required as an integral part of Ph.D. program
in criminal justice and criminology (Nolasco, et al., 2010).
As a discipline, we have certainly not outgrown the need to consider law in
research and education. While much of the research in criminal justice and criminology
has focused on the impact of various social structural and cultural forces on various
criminal justice system outcomes, there persists a need to look at the effect and impact
of legal factors. David Garland’s (2013) 2012 Sutherland Address to the American
Society of Criminology stressed the need to consider this factor:
The second consideration has to do with a sociological bias that has shaped our
5

causal analyses. Until now, the punishment and society literature has
concentrated on what one might term ‘deep’ or background causation: the kinds
of cultural, political, and economic processes that I discussed previously. But this
is only half the story. We should recognize that the proximate causes of changing
patterns of punishment lie not in social processes but in state and legal processes:
chiefly in legislative changes made to sentencing law and in the actions of legal
decision makers such as prosecutors, sentencing judges, corrections
departments, and parole boards pursuant to these legal changes. (Garland, 2013,
p. 484)
If the discipline is to properly study these “state and legal process” then its future
scholars—Ph.D. students—must develop legal competency through adequate
understanding of the role of law in deciding what is criminal and how punishment can and
should be meted out justly.
Doctoral programs should also include training in black letter law because more
stringent academic hiring standards in the discipline in general show preference for
doctorate degrees (Ph.D.) over Juris Doctorates (J.D.s). In academe, J.D.s are not
considered terminal degrees, and there are compelling reasons why they should not be
given equal weight as Ph.D.s in social science (Hemmens, 2008). The training required for
J.D.s are not tailored toward the demands of social science scholarship and research. As a
result, many criminal justice and criminology programs prefer graduates with Ph.D.
qualifications in their faculty. While this may be laudable, it also means that persons
trained mainly in law, such as a candidate with a J.D., are less likely to be hired as a
tenured faculty.
6

Examination of the tenure track faculty vacancy announcements on HigherEd Jobs
as of 5 June 2014, reveal that out of 46 postings, Criminology and Criminal Justice
programs prefer specializations in the following areas: corrections (7%), generalist
(16%), juvenile delinquency (5%), law enforcement (16%), law (16%), open (24%),
research methods (9%), and theory (7%). The demand for applicants with specialization
in law (criminal law, criminal procedure, courts, substantive and procedural law) is
considerable, constituting 15% of the job postings—as much as the demand for applicants
who are generalists and who have law enforcement areas of concentration. To satisfy both
the desire to be a Ph.D. dominated faculty while also including robust education and
research in law, there is a clear need to develop legal competency among Ph.D. graduates,
including training in black letter law.
There are reasons why legal competency is desirable and needed in criminal justice
and criminology. Five propositions help reaffirm the benefits that doctoral legal
competency provides the discipline:

Proposition 1: LEGAL COMPETENCY HELPS ENABLE PH.D. GRADUATES CONDUCT
SCHOLARLY RESEARCH IN LAW RELATED TOPICS. The research field in “law in criminal
justice” is vast and largely unexplored, particularly in the administrative and operational
phases of criminal justice. For example, two of the current concerns in criminal justice are
eyewitness misidentification partly resulting from media hype and the use or misuse of
force by the police. These are not theoretical dilemmas, but are instead real, recurring, and
day-to-day concerns among practitioners and the public. Research in “law in criminal
justice” on these topics is best done by Ph.D. graduates familiar with quantitative research
7

methods, rather than by lawyers bereft of quantitative skills. Research on these issues,
however, requires legal competency, based on knowledge and understanding of current
law and agency practices.
Quantitative legal research is largely an underdeveloped tool at a time when
quantification has become normative in just about any social science discipline. This
deemphasis in quantitative legal research may be traced to legal research being done by
lawyers who do not much background in statistics or quantification. It is impractical to give
lawyers extensive background in quantitative methods since law is a specialized field and
advocacy driven. Lawyers have more practical concerns that do not require quantification.
A better option would be to enhance the legal competency of criminal justice Ph.D. students
to better equip them with skills that can help shed light on legal issues inherent in criminal
justice and criminology.
Legal studies in the discipline can also contribute to determining legal outcomes and
their validity, employing social science research methods along with legal research
methods. Scholarly research can potentially lower bias in case outcomes because these are
empirically tested and rely on systematically collected data, use accepted methodological
standards to analyze the results, undergo a rigorous peer review process by experts in the
field, are subject to replication, and hence, are both testable and validated (Grunwald,
2013). Thus, scholarly research, when properly presented and admitted in court, may
counter a judge’s “potentially false perception” of social science data, persuade the judge
that his or her “empirical intuition” may be inaccurate, and “increases transparency of
judicial decisions” (Grunwald, 2013, pp. 1432-1433).
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Legal research in criminal justice and criminology, for example, may prove
invaluable during trial (Monahan & Walker, 1991), as these may be presented as “social
authority” (Monahan & Walker, 1986, p. 488). Monahan and Walker (1986) recommend
that courts rely on research that has “survived the critical review of the scientific
community, is based on valid methodology, generalizable to the case at hand, and
confirmed by a larger body of research” (Monahan & Walker, 1986, p. 489). Walker and
Monahan (1987, pp. 568-570, 559) suggest that scholarly research can provide the “social
framework” or background context of a particular factual issue in a legal case that “helps
the factfinder interpret the validity and relevance of adjudicative facts presented before the
court.” In State v. Chapple (1983), for example, a defendant charged with murder based on
eye witness testimony attempted to introduce expert testimony to show that the
identification process was not reliable. The defense introduced in evidence social science
research on the unreliability of eyewitness identification (Grunwald, 2013). This can make
the crucial difference in a decision.
Scholarly legal research on criminal justice issues can further potentially reduce
bias in case outcomes arising from the judge’s personal experiences or unguided empirical
observations (Epstein & King, 2002; Grunwald, 2013; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman,
2011; Leonard, 2002; Meares, 2002). Legal scholars have noted the relationship between
political beliefs and judicial decision-making in environmental and administrative case law
(Cross & Tiller, 1998; Landes & Posner, 2009; Perino, 2006; Revesz, 1997; Sisk & Heise,
2005; Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman, & Sawicki, 2006). One study showed that when decisions
of the Environmental Protection Agency were challenged before the courts, “the reversal
rate for panels with two Democrats and one Republican” ranged from 2% to 13% as
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opposed to panels with “two Republicans and one Democrat” where the reversal rate
ranged from 54% to 89% (Revesz, 1997, p. 1763). Another study found that among D.C.
circuit cases reviewing an administrative law under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. (1984), when the agency’s policy outcome is “consistent with the policy
preferences of the panel majority,” the court is 31% more likely to defer than if it does not
(Cross & Tiller, 1998, p. 2171).

Proposition 2: PH.D. CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE GRADUATES WITH
LEGAL TRAINING ARE BETTER PREPARED TO TEACH LAW AS A PHENOMENON
RELATED TO SOCIAL REALITY. Law schools, steeped in doctrinal legal teaching and
research do not, in general, teach social facts and social reality as empirical phenomenon
(Berard, 2009; Samuel, 2008). Law schools do not study the contexts of legal practice. For
example, there are few courses in law schools that focus on “law firms, corporate counsel’s
offices, or government lawyering” (Rubin, 2007, p. 642). Social sciences such as criminal
justice and criminology, by learning and offering courses in areas of law relevant to their
disciplines, can analyze, test, and examine law and legal phenomenon as a social reality
(Birks, 1998; Lawless, Robbennolt, & Ulen, 2009; Siems, 2011).
Limitations of existing law studies have been recognized by jurists and legal
scholars. Legal academics point out the dearth of research in law as a social and empirical
phenomenon within the context of social institutions (Bradney, 1998). Cotterrell (1995, p.
296) observed that “all the centuries of purely doctrinal writing on law have produced less
valuable knowledge about what law is, as a social phenomenon, and what it does than the
relatively few decades of work in sophisticated modern empirical socio-legal studies.”
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Hepple (1996, p. 485), in his inaugural lecture at Cambridge University, noted that law
students should study among other things “social sciences, philosophy, ethics, history,” and
have the “ability to comprehend evidence and methods of social sciences.” Bradney (1998,
p. 79) espouses a broader form of legal studies that he terms “socio-legal studies” in order
to promote wider learning within the context of the community. Socio-legal studies will
enhance knowledge of the law in three ways: first, while doctrinal legal studies prohibit
inquiries outside the legal context of laws and its authorities, socio-legal studies
encourages and facilitates them; second, by engaging in other disciplines, the student will
have to “enter into the communities that constitute the discipline and embrace its values;”
and third, by engaging other disciplines, students are able to pursue learning and research
not constrained by the “limits of one discipline” but by a mix of different disciplines of their
own choosing (Bradney, 1998, pp. 79-80).
Given the focus on traditional doctrinal research in law schools, legal education has
perennially faced the issue of the status of law in academe and whether it should be
considered a social science or a natural science akin to mathematics (Grey, 1983; Rubin,
2007; Schweber, 1999). Christopher Langdell, Dean of Harvard Law School who first
introduced the casebook method of legal education viewed law as a form of natural science
with its own coherent and logical structure (Chase, 1979; Rubin, 2007; Samuel, 2008).
Legal education therefore should use the same approach as the natural sciences, through
“inquiry that would disclose its principles,” by studying the law’s particular manifestations
“just as the natural scientist could discern the universal law of gravitation by observing the
behavior of specific falling objects” (Rubin, 2007, p. 632)
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Samuel (2008, p. 294) states that one argument against law as a social science is
“grounded in [law’s] quest for a natural science status,” specifically akin to mathematics, a
non-empirical scientific discipline “where the test is one of coherence rather than
correspondence.” Traditional legal studies, with its emphasis on the coherence and
consistency of doctrines and legal authorities (e.g. statutes, cases, and customs) aim to
elevate law to scientific inquiry, analogous to mathematics with its coherent system of
formulas and solutions (Nolasco, et al., 2010). Law has become pre-occupied with its “own
internal organization” that, as an academic discipline, it has “completely isolated itself from
social reality” (Samuel, 2008, p. 295).
Distinctions have been made between doctrinal legal studies and comparative legal
studies (Nolasco, et al., 2010; Samuel, 2008). Most law schools, for example, rely mainly on
doctrinal analysis and the Socratic method of instruction (Berard, 2009; Bradney, 1998).
Samuel (2008) argues that doctrinal legal studies are not a social science because it does
not attempt to contribute knowledge to social reality as an empirical phenomenon. Legal
education is thus limited in its capacity to study the “complexity and importance of the
relations between law and society” or to understand social scientific perspectives on the
law (Berard, 2009, p. 191). Comparative legal studies, however, “deserves to qualify as a
social science” because of its potential to examine law from outside the paradigm of legal
authorities internal to law as a discipline (Samuel, 2008, p. 321). Samuel (2008, pp. 319,
320) cautions that comparative legal studies, “if it is to make a serious contribution to
knowledge in general, must employ comparison as an epistemological tool” beyond the
framework of the “traditional internal doctrinal methodology.”
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Although doctrinal analysis focuses on legal concepts and doctrines inductively or
deductively, as extracted from law and cases, such method does not denote complete
isolation from social reality or from empirical examination of facts. Law students examine
facts, evidence, and empirical data. After learning legal rules and doctrines, a law student
must be able to analyze social reality in the form of facts of the case to be able to interpret
the applicability of certain doctrines to the factual situation. A general handicap of law
students is their inability to analyze factual situations systematically (beyond the current
case) so as to be able to draw statistical conclusions as is common in the social sciences.
That is not in their training. Law students are more often taught to examine one factual
situation at a time or resort to landmark cases or authorities to support legal reasoning.
They are not trained to explain facts as social reality; instead, they are trained to use the
facts to draw legal conclusions.
It is because of this limitation in law studies that the social sciences can effectively
complement legal knowledge. Social scientists aim to study society and social facts at
various levels of analysis as empirical data. Criminal justice and criminology students have
the background that enables them to extract facts from a pool of cases that discuss a
specific legal area of concern, as well as to systematize, and analyze such facts using social
scientific statistical methods. If law students are indeed limited to a traditional doctrinal
analysis of legal authorities, then criminal justice and criminology students are potentially
able to contribute knowledge to law as a social reality. Consider, for example, the current
and controversial issue in some major cities of the legality of strip searches. Going beyond
a doctrinal legal analysis, social scientists can examine the factual basis of a pool of cases
(extracted from legal databases such as Lexis-Nexis or Westlaw) that influenced the courts’
13

decisions on whether or not to uphold it. Such factual analysis can focus on a variety of
factors such as socio-demographic individual variables of the person subjected to the strip
search, contextual variables such as location, time, length, and intrusiveness of the search,
and geographic variables such as region, district, city, or area of the search. All these
factors can then be analyzed to determine the likelihood of the courts deciding in favor or
against the legality of the search based on the cases.
Because of the technical nature of legal documents and the precise nature of legal
research, knowledge of the law and legal research is central to this exercise by social
scientists. By offering law courses in the social sciences, students are equipped with
knowledge of the law (including case law), legal research and methodology, and legal
academic writing. Leighton, Mortimer, and Whatley (1995) point out another compelling
reason for teaching law to undergraduate criminal justice and criminology students. Their
1994 survey of the work of legal academics found that 92 percent of all legal academics
they surveyed preferred to teach either College of Law or law postgraduates to any other
type of student, because the latter involves, “teaching law to non-lawyers” (Skwarok, 1995,
p. 189) thus, implying a secondary or inferior type of teaching (Leighton, et al., 1995, p. 34).
Students outside law school have little opportunity to study law since law courses are
either absent from, or offered only as a small part of their disciplines. This prevents them
from obtaining a “real understanding of legal concepts” as well as the subtleties of legal
analysis (Ridley, 1994, p. 284). Thus, it is incumbent upon criminal justice and criminology
departments to offer law courses, whether doctrinal, socio-legal, or comparative law; it
remedies a deficiency in the field.
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Several reasons justify offering law courses to non-law students, including criminal
justice and criminology doctoral students. Harris (1986, p. 112) argues that, “empirically,
law is a component part of the wider social and political structure, is inextricably related to
it in an infinite ways, and can therefore only be properly understood in that context.” The
benefits of teaching law outside traditional confines have also been noted in several areas.
Teaching law to accountancy students, for example, resulted in a 6 percent rise in those
students who “definitely saw law as being relevant to their studies” (Ridley, 1994, p. 283).
Cartan and Vilkinas (1990, p. 248) further found that teaching law to managers enabled
them to view law as a “living entity which has a future as well as a present and recognizes
law as an evolving process with important elements of history, sociology, politics, and
economics.” Students outside of law school must “see the place that law has in the object of
their study,” to properly understand the wider social and political structure of which law is
merely a component, albeit an essential one (Bradney, 1998, p. 83). Within the discipline of
criminal justice and criminology, the teaching of law must be made relevant to the study of
the objects of the discipline (i.e., crime or anti-social behavior and the criminal justice
system). If law is to be learned as a tool for understanding a social phenomenon, then it is
best taught by those trained in this approach rather than by those trained as advocates of
opposing sides in a two-sided conflict.

Proposition 3: THERE IS AN INCREASING TREND TOWARD INTERDISCIPLINARY
STUDIES AND INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES IN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES,
INCLUDING LAW. Interdisciplinary studies such as law conjoined with areas like
economics (Korobkin, 2014; Marciano & Ramello, 2014), medicine (Madden & Wayne,
15

2003; Preston-Shoot & McKimm, 2011), history (Rubin, 2007; Samuel, 2012), political
science, society, and sociology (Schluchter, 2002) have spurred the growth of more
empirically based research on the law and its various institutions (Bartie, 2010; Bradney,
1998; Cownie, 2004; Kennedy & Fisher, 2006; Macey, 1997; Shaffer & Ginsburg, 2012;
Siems & MacSithigh, 2012). Distinctions, however, should be made between
interdisciplinary approaches to law that use the social science methodology and those that
do not (i.e., interdisciplinary approaches based on feminism, critical race theory or critical
legal studies) (Bradney, 1998; Macey, 1997; Siems & MacSithigh, 2012). A
multidisciplinary legal approach that uses empirically based social sciences methodology
can increase its impact and promote a greater level of intellectual discourse among a wider
audience of scholars outside of the legal community (Epstein, Martin, & Boyd, 2007;
Epstein, Martin, & Schneider, 2006; Macey, 1997). Thus, socio-legal studies that develop
testable hypotheses and assertions about the law are “empirically refutable” and more
convincing than interdisciplinary approaches to law that do not rely on the social sciences,
such as the critical race approach or those based on feminism (Macey, 1997, p. 172).
The increasing body of social scientific studies of law and legal institutions in the
social sciences (Tait & De Young, 2000) is paralleled by efforts to increase social science
instruction in law schools (Bybee, 2004; Berard, 2009; Chemerinsky, 2008; Wexler, 1990).
Reforms in legal education, for example, call for an interdisciplinary legal pedagogy that
includes exposure of law students to social science methodology, including statistics
(Johnstone, 1992; Morris, 2005; Stevens, 1983; Wexler, 1990). Chemerinsky (2008, pp.
597-598), Founding Dean of the University of California Irvine Law School, observes that,
“law is inherently interdisciplinary and must be shaped by understanding fields such as
16

economics, philosophy, and psychology.” He lamented that, law schools “still do too little to
bring these disciplines into their classes in a systematic way” and do not make any
“coordinated efforts” to ensure “interdisciplinary instruction” in the curriculum
(Chemerinsky, 2008, pp. 597-598). He also admonished his colleagues to rethink legal
education by becoming more interdisciplinary, and providing students with the
“knowledge and perspectives” that come from social science disciplines such as economics,
sociology, philosophy, and psychology (Chemerinsky, 2008, p. 598).
Other law academics also propose a broader legal education that addresses law in
its totality, by examining not only the black letter of the law but also the non-legal context
of legal issues (Eisenmann, 1973; Manning, 1969; Packer & Ehrlich, 1972). Manning
(1969) suggests that non-legal considerations are relevant in examining the social
processes within which law functions, including the economic and political settings of law
and legal institutions. Packer and Ehrlich (1972, p. 60) similarly propose that law be
taught as a “social process,” focusing the law student’s attention on the conception of the
legal system, various legal actors and institutions and their functions, their impact on other
elements in society, and changes in the legal system. Wilkins (1999, pp. 79-80), on the
other hand, calls for “systematic and rigorous” quantitative and qualitative research on the
legal profession’s institutions, organizations, norms, and practices.
With this increasing multidisciplinary reform in legal education, criminal justice and
criminology stand to benefit from building legal competency among its graduates through
incorporating law courses in the graduate curriculum, whether as black letter law,
sociology of law, or law and society. Social science scholarship can contribute to legal
education through its use of empirical research methods in “gathering evidence or
17

assessing claims, to illuminating such questions as the impacts of law on clients and
society” (Berard, 2009, p. 211). Duxbury (2003) asserts that the law and society movement
has made important contributions in examining how law operates within a social context
beyond what can be gleaned from the study of strictly black letter law. The social sciences
can contribute to legal studies by providing more comprehensive and systematic
knowledge of the practical realities of law, its institutions, and the legal profession
(Banakar, 2011).
The value of law courses in criminal justice and criminology cannot be
overemphasized. Law schools at present are not currently staffed to teach the full range of
legal courses that go beyond traditional doctrinal analysis (Berard, 2009; Trubek & Plager,
1985). Berard (2009, p. 200) observes that law students have a “much better chance” of
receiving interdisciplinary education “either by continuing reforms within law schools, or
by engaging in interdisciplinary studies which partly or completely step outside the law
school curriculum into other available institutions and disciplines.” Reforms include hiring
law faculty members with social science credentials, offering more social science electives
in law schools either during the first year of law studies or as required courses, requiring
an upper-class curriculum that offers students the opportunity to concentrate in one area
of specialization that goes beyond the mastery of legal rules and incorporates the
substance of social sciences in the courses, offering more joint degree or multi-disciplinary
programs, and increasing resources for law faculty through providing them with more
pedagogical social science materials (Berard, 2009; Rubin, 2007).
In the social sciences, familiarity with and understanding of law can further enhance
legal studies and vice versa. Precisely because social sciences incorporate social theory and
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social research methods, disciplines such as criminal justice and criminology are better
positioned to study law as social phenomenon and not just as a statutory mandate or legal
precedent. Interdisciplinary approaches in the social sciences are not unusual and the
various disciplines have in fact been enriched by multidisciplinary approaches to the study
of social reality. Criminal justice and criminology can benefit more from such incorporative
practices. An interdisciplinary focus has been one of the greatest strengths of the discipline.
As Clear (2001, p. 711) has stated, “We are multidisciplinary always, interdisciplinary at
our best.”

Proposition 4. PROFESSORS WITH BACKGROUND MAINLY IN LAW ARE NOT
TRAINED TO CRITIQUE AND QUESTION DOCTRINAL LAW. THUS, EFFORTS TO
REFORM CRIMINAL JUSTICE LAWS ARE NIGGARDLY RESEARCHED OR ADVOCATED.
As a discipline, law is anchored on precedents, meaning how earlier cases were decided
and how issues were resolved in previous cases. This is because lawyers are traditionally
taught to look at what the law is and not what it should be. The main thrust in law schools
is adherence to precedents rather than how justice can be achieved better by what the law
should be. Ph.D. graduates with a good background in law, and using broader knowledge of
the tools of social science, can employ this approach more effectively.
Wexler (1990, p. 198) observes that “social science data” is relevant to the
“resolution of legal and public policy disputes.” However, since law training primarily
focuses on doctrinal law and repetitive analysis of case doctrine, law students are not
taught to question its relevance for public policy (Berard, 2009; Bradney, 1998; Rubin,
2007; Wexler, 1990). Law schools train their students to perceive certain sources of law
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and legal authorities as authoritative. They are taught the doctrine of stare decisis, which
basically means “let the decision stand.” There is justification for in a field where justice
should be predictable and consequences follow a punishable act. As a tool for reform based
on current research, however, this orientation falls short of being causative or effective.
Students are thus not trained to question or criticize legal authorities. Instead, they learn
what the law is, spending “much of their time examining legal texts and trying to make
sense of them” to be able to apply them to relevant factual situations (Samuel, 2008, p.
309). This approach is certainly necessary to prepare the student for eventual legal
practice after law school. It detracts, however, from the reality of legal practice not as an
isolated field requiring simply route memory and understanding of black letter law but as a
process ensconced in a broader criminal justice system.
Non-law students, including those in criminal justice and criminology, are better
prepared to assess the relevance of the social sciences in helping shape the law and the
legal system (Wexler, 1990). By approaching law as a social science, the usefulness of
court decisions and legislation can be viewed from an external and empirical perspective
(Samuel, 2008), with more enlightened results. Posner (1998, p. 6) writes about
economists who analyze law by “constructing models of legal rules and evaluating their
potential effect on overall social welfare.” Social science research in law affords
opportunities to challenge doctrine, among others, by evaluating and questioning how
judges actually decide cases (Frank, 1931).
In the discipline of criminal justice and criminology, continuing studies of either the
black letter law or even more far-reaching socio-legal studies that examine law and its
social implications can reveal its relevance or irrelevance, its benefits or costs, and its
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strengths or weaknesses relating to what law seeks to achieve. Studies that focus on
inconsistency among court decisions on a particular issue, for example, can reveal whether
or not a specific decision is worth re-examining. For example, research by Nolasco, del
Carmen, and Vaughn (2010) showed that the U.S. Supreme Court’s modification of the good
faith exception of the exclusionary rule in Herring v. United States (2009) (to apply to law
enforcement officers who relied on errors or mistakes of other law enforcement personnel
as long as these errors were merely negligent and isolated, instead of systemic, recurring,
and/or deliberate) resulted in a divergence and inconsistencies in its application among
federal district and circuit courts and thus detract from the strength and value of the
exclusionary rule as an evidentiary remedy in criminal procedure.
Examining its social impact and ramifications outside of black letter law can also
lead to reform and improvements in the law and the criminal justice system. Studies on
access to legal services (Bewicke, 2011; Morris, 2013; Rogerson, 2013), differential
treatment of white collar defendants versus street criminals (Guidice, 2011; Morris &
Sayed, 2013; Payne, Blowers, & Jarvis, 2012; Payne, Dabney, Ekhomu, 2013; Perri, 2011;
Richman, 2013), and representation and treatment of women and minorities in the
criminal justice system (Bright, Kohl, & Jonson-Reid, 2014; Klein & Kress, 1976; Nolasco &
Vaughn, 2010; Sangoi & Goshin, 2014) are helpful in identifying the deficiencies of the
criminal justice system and crafting reform policies.

PROPOSITIONS 5: COURSES IN LAW IN CJ PROGRAMS ARE ARGUABLY BETTER
TAUGHT FROM A BROADER PERSPECTIVE BY PH.D. GRADUATES WHO HAVE LEGAL
COMPETENCY. Ph.D. graduates with legal competency are more broadly trained in law21

related issues affecting the discipline than those who do not have a good background in law
or those whose approach, by virtue of their training, is essentially advocacy oriented. Their
socio-legal perspective of any law-related issue relevant to the discipline enables them to
teach law as part of the overall CJ discipline instead of the more narrow focus that will
likely be used by law practitioners. Ph.D. graduates can and should be scholars; law
graduates are trained to be good practitioners. An assumption is that most law courses in
CJ programs, particularly on the undergraduate level, are taught by lawyers and
practitioners serving as adjuncts (Engvall, 2007). This is particularly true in small CJ
programs where law courses are usually delegated to practitioners because they are the
ones who know the law. While competent, the focus in practitioner-taught courses is more
likely on the narrower aspects of law as experienced in legal practice. Full-time Ph.D.
faculty can teach law from a broader perspective, integrating law with other findings in
social science and criminology. Conversely, criminal justice departments are reluctant for
Ph.D. graduates to teach law because it is viewed as a specialized field which can and
should be taught only by lawyers. In the course of their career, Ph.D. graduates will likely
be asked to teach law, particularly in small departments. Developing legal competency
through adequate training in law better prepares and enhances the marketability of Ph.D.
graduates who are on the job market or are already part of academe. In the process, law is
then taught from a broader perspective. An adequate knowledge of law, however, is crucial
in this process.
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CONCLUSION
Robert Quinney (1970, p. 3) is right when decades ago, he said: “There is no crime
without some form of declaration.” In any civilized country in the world today, crime exists
because there is a law prohibiting and punishing the act or omission. Without law declaring
an act punishable and how, there is no crime—punishment then can become arbitrary and
capricious. Law is central to our concept of crime and its punishment - and it should be if a
country is to judge and punish those who commit crimes with fairness and due process.
Those who teach criminology and criminal justice must have a good knowledge of and
about law for the discipline and the public to be best served. How this is achieved needs
further study, but one of its essential ingredients is legal competency among those who
teach and conduct research that helps determine its future.
The social sciences enable the general public to better understand the social context
and implications of any means of social control. The discipline of criminal justice and
criminology, by incorporating law courses in its curriculum, benefits from a fuller
understanding of all aspects of the criminal justice system and by viewing crime or
delinquency as a social behavior. By incorporating law courses as part of the curriculum,
and recognizing the impact of these courses, the discipline stands to enrich the field of law
in criminal justice and helps dispense justice. The discipline’s need for law trained
professionals with Ph.D. credentials is best met by requiring law courses in the curriculum.
This is particularly true for those who teach in the discipline.
Recognizing the benefits of interdisciplinary studies in other academic areas,
including law, other programs have initiated interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary
research in their fields. This growing trend recognizes the value of a multi-dimensional
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approach to the study of any social subject, including law and the criminal justice system.
Criminal justice and criminology can add to our understanding of crime and the justice
system by institutionalizing law courses that help students better understand when crime
occurs and its legal consequences. Law is the ultimate and most coercive means of
governmental control in the United States. In a real sense, without law there is no criminal
justice; without law criminology can be a tool for explaining criminal behavior, but cannot
legally prescribe ways of punishing an offender. It is important that those who administer
criminal justice and criminology know something more than “a little something” about
criminal justice law but it is even more important that criminal justice laws be understood
by those who teach and wish to improve it.
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